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EDUCATING “HOMO VIDENS” 
PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN AS A WAY OF COUNTERING THE “ANTIMEDITATIVE SITUATION” 





Homo videns is today’s man or woman whose knowledge-frames are shaped by the use of 
modern media. The passive experience (from childhood on) of an overwhelmingly image-based 
media can prevent children from developing a capacity for abstraction--that is, the ability to form 
general concepts, to make comparisons, and to acknowledge different points of view.  What is at 
stake is the future of democracy as a form of life that rests on rational discussion and 
argumentative skills. Philosophy for Children offers an effective means to counter this 
phenomenon. If homo videns is (or risks being) overwhelmed by the immediacy of the medium 
and narcotized by ‘un-reflection’ like a prisoner in Plato’s cave, children and adolescents who 
participate in the discourses of Philosophy for Children have the opportunity to experiment with 
thinking, to have first-hand experience in the co-construction of knowledge, and thereby to 
become citizens of a real and effective democracy. 
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Over the last twenty years some of the most prominent scholars in political science 
have been pointing out the danger for democracy posed by the massive dissemination 
of TV and other ‘video-media’. As I understand it, the argument reads as follows:  a 
mature democratic society requires its members to take part in public discourse and 
deliberation, and therefore people who are – in Matthew Lipman’s words – “engaged in 
thinking, reflective, introspective, responsible, reasonable, collaborative, cooperative.”i. 
But the environment in which future citizens grow up, instead of enhancing these skills, 
is dominated by ‘visual communication’; reflective thought is supplanted by a passive 
submission to an endless flux of images that does not demand a critical attitude but on 
the contrary, mesmerizes, induces a quasi-narcotic status, and overcomes the individual 
by its immediacy. The problem lies in the form of the message rather than in the 
contents of the images (the triviality of so many TV shows; the violence of the 
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videogames etc.). Images, in their ceaseless flux, impose themselves as givenness, as 
unquestionable facts, and the audience is substantially inactive. Less attentive than 
attracted, it is – as advertising agents know well - a target, a subject to be seduced, not 
an interlocutor actively involved in an inquiry. Rational persuasion, based on arguments 
and therefore on a rhetoric animated by logos, is mostly replaced by sensory excitement, 
by aesthetic (in the etymological sense of aesthesisii) and emotional blandishment, by 
recourse to what is unusual, surprising, interesting (in Kierkegaard’s sense of the word). 
Visual communication addresses our subjectivity in a way that risks undermining what 
is the very basis of a democratic society, that is the capacity for rational discussion in 
which each and everyone must be potentially involved (and therefore ‘equipped’).   
Within the framework outlined so far, this paper is structured in two parts: 
1. First, I will sketch the convergent ideas of three authors who – concerned 
for the future of democracy – have sounded an alarm on the disruptive (for 
democratic discourse) effects of the predominance of television, and of a 
predominantly visual culture in general; 
2. Secondly, I will try to illustrate how the program of Philosophy for 
Children is an effective means for countering the consequences of this visual 
culture, and for encouraging attitudes that are necessary for a democratic society. 
In this paper I will not dwell on a close analysis of complex thinking and its 
articulation by Lipman as critical, creative and caring thinking. It would in fact be 
possible to illustrate how each one of these dimensions can act as a barrier against 
the dominance of ‘video-culture’iii, but I will confine myself to showing how the 
paradigmatic P4C session, as a practice of thinking and inquiry, is opposed in a 
pedagogically significant manner to the visual (and un-critical) environment in 
which children more typically grow upiv.  
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§1: THE BIRTH OF HOMO (TELE-)VIDENS 
 
One of the first thinkers who approached the issue of the risks for contemporary 
democratic societies linked with entering - in his words – the Age of the Eye was Otto 
Neurath (1996), one of the leading figures of the Vienna Circle. He was a sociologist, an 
educator of adults, the conceiver and founder of the International Encyclopaedia of Unified 
Science. His reflections on the issue we are dealing with can be found in his posthumous 
work Visual education – Humanisation vs Popularisation. Though written in 1945, when TV 
and videogames did not yet exist, the book somehow anticipates the warning that has 
emerged over the last two decades. This is due not only to Neurath’s  visionary capacity 
to analyse the development of contemporary society, but to the fact that TV and the 
Internet are the epitome of a tendency dating back to the second half of the 19th century 
when the electronic media (photography and telegraph) began to replace the 
typographical  in framing minds [POSTMAN 2002]. Thus, Neurath wrote at a moment 
when electric media already had a long history. He understood before others that 
something crucial had happened in the history of human knowledge and 
communication, something we had to come to grips with in order for liberal democracy 
to survive. This paper does not focus on Neurath’s solutions and educational strategies--
that is the idea of a visual education through an international pictorial language aimed at 
diffusing knowledge among wider areas of population so that each and everyone could 
be equipped with ‘intellectual means’, and provided with the necessary information to 
take part in public debates and in the decisional processes of his or her community. This 
paper does  focus on Neurath’s diagnosis, which is a powerful and passionate 
examination of the risks to which democracy is exposed in the Age of  the Eye, in the 
epoch in which ‘visualization’ prevails. 
Neurath describes what he calls “our visual scene” as follows:  
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Frequent changes of the visual scene are characteristic of our modern 
urbanised life, which is gradually invading the rural districts as well. 
Posters call to us from the walls of streets and corridors; exhibitions invite 
us; the cinema screen attracts millions of people night after night; an 
increasing number of periodicals and pamphlets present new pictures in 
colour or in black and white […] Change of visual impressions is the 
norm […] Lantern slides, film strips, films, models, still and in motion, 
give documentary information, realistic and symbolic» [NEURATH 1996, 
p. 291]. 
 
In another passage he points out what is at stake from an educational point of view: 
Modern life is tied up with quick changes in our environment, with hurry 
and haste, and adaptations to these features form a part of the educational 
approach, but it will depend on human decision to what extent humanity 
will guard a meditative mood and support habits of argumentation  
[NEURATH 1996, p. 288]. 
  
Neurath is aware of a potentially fatal gap: on the one hand “arguing and 
meditating, which form the backbone of serious education according to our tradition”  
[Ibidem] and which are necessary to a democratic society; on the other the proliferation 
of visual media which threatens “the meditative mood [which] is an essential element of 
all kinds of education. To a certain extent, meditation is essential for all kinds of 
activity” [NEURATH 1996, p. 267]. Every educational undertaking should take this gap 
into account, and promote actions that counter the anti-meditative drift which 
jeopardizes the destiny of democratic society, if the latter is understood as a ‘place’ 
where rational discussion and inquiry rule. Neurath’s solution (that is, visual education) 
can still represent, if opportunely updated, a helpful educational strategy, along 
directions which cannot be examined here. In the second part of this paper I’ll try to 
show how P4C is a particularly effective curriculum for counteracting the anti-meditative 
situation of our times, which Neurath diagnosed in such a prophetic way (and apart 
from a traditionalist and reactionary mood). 
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In the last years of his life Karl Popper, a fellow countryman of Neurath and major 
opponent in the epistemological fieldv, regularly insisted on how much TV, with its 
pernicious impact on children’s minds, represents the new threat which liberal 
democracy and the open society (that is, a society that supports and fosters open-
mindedness) has to face after the fall of communism.vi Although the focus of Popper 
(who refers to CONDRY 1993) is very specifically targeting the quantity of violence 
shown on TV to young people, there are in his argumentsvii some aspects worth 
mentioning in our context. First of all it is noteworthy that Popper - approaching the 
issue of the role of TV - felt the need to broaden his definition of democracy or, better 
still, to underscore aspects of democracy which lie in the background in his other 
writings. Popper’s fundamental idea, the core-notion around which his political thought 
is organized, is that democracy is the political system within which it is possible to 
remove rulers without violence and bloodshed. In his booklet on TV Popper argues 
against a loose – and potentially harmful - sense of the term ‘democratic’. In order to 
justify the poor, trashy quality of the TV shows, a media tycoon said to Popper that 
people wanted it and that respect must be paid to the desires of people. His choices – the 
tycoon concluded - were supported by «the reasons of the democracy» [POPPER 2002, 
P. 72]. «Now – Popper remark  – there’s nothing in the democracy that justifies the thesis 
of that media tycoon, according to whose opinion the fact of offering TV programs at 
ever-lower levels from an educational point of view corresponds to the principles of 
democracy “because people want it”» [Ibidem]viii. In order to counter such a viewpoint 
Popper emphasises the strong connection between democracy and education:  
. . . democracy always aimed at raising the level of education; this is an 
old, traditional aspiration of democratic societies. The ideas of that 
‘gentleman’ don’t absolutely correspond to the idea of democracy, which 
was always and is still the idea of raising general education by offering to 
each and everyone increasingly better opportunities [Ibidem].    
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A slight interpretative tilt allows us to make explicit all the implications of this 
quotation and to go beyond Popper’s firm statement that «in democracy ... there is 
nothing more than the mere principle of defence from dictatorship» [Ibidem].  
Democracy is also a way of life which is based upon and encourages rational discussion, 
critical habits of thought, and the intellectual passions [POLANYI 1990, cap. VI]. As a 
consequence it is possible to reject the statement of reactionaries of all times (and, 
nowadays, of media tycoons) that democracy is the prevalence of mass instinct and base 
passions.  In fact education is the first line of defence for democracy – taken in this 
strong meaning.  On this topic Popper tells us something which will help our exposition 
to progress. By drawing on his own evolutionary epistemology Popper underlines that 
the mental development of children depends, to a great extent, on the interaction with 
their environment. For this reason,  
. . . what we call education is something which influences this 
environment in a way that we judge good for the development of these 
children ... What does ‘learning’ really mean? And what does ‘teaching’ 
really mean? It means to influence their environment in such a way that 
children can prepare themselves for their future tasks ... For this reason all 
depends on the environment, and therefore we, as the older generation, 
have the responsibility to create the best environmental conditions. Now, 
the point is that television is a part of children’s environment and it is, of 
course, a part we are responsible for, because it is a man-made part of the 
environment» [POPPER 2002, p. 75].  
 
We cannot discuss here Popper’s proposal to require a license people working in the 
field of broadcasting. It is sufficient to underline that the effects of television are 
connected with the fact that television represents an educational environment (or a 
curriculum, to avail ourselves of a Postman’s suggestion [POSTMAN 1983]). Therefore, 
in order to counteract its influence on democratic society, we have to operate in the area 
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of education, by designing learning environments and curricula which would defuse the 
anti-democratic potential of the video-culture.     
A few years after Popper’s pamphlet appeared, the most prominent Italian 
theorist of democracy, Giovanni Sartori, approached the same problem in a more radical 
way. Sartori does not limit himself to denouncing the violence in TV shows but 
admonishes that  
 
TV is producing a permutation, a metamorphosis that regards the very 
nature of the homo sapiens. TV is not simply a communication medium; it 
is at the same time paideia, an ‘anthropogenetic’ means, that is, a medium 
which generates a new anthropos, a new kind of human being » [SARTORI 
1997, p. 14].  
 
From homo sapiens, «a product of written civilization» we are moving towards homo 
videns, a human being for whom «word is replaced by image» [SARTORI 1997, p. XV] 
and whose main faculty is not reason but sight. Sartori’s alarm is based on the fact that 
«our children watch hours and hours of television before learning to read and write» 
[SARTORI 1997, p. 14] and that «the child, whose first school … is television, is a 
symbolic animal that receives its imprint, its educational mould, from an utterly sight-
centred world» [SARTORI 1997, p. 15]. Implicitly diverging from Popper’s (and 
Condry’s) views, Sartori concludes:  
 
In this paideia the tendency to violence ... is only part of the problem. The 
child’s brain is like a sponge registering and absorbing indiscriminately ... 
everything he or she sees. On the contrary, and on the other side, children 
brought up by the TV do not read as adults, and become video-dotards, life 
sentenced to videogames [Ibidem].  
 
Sartori’s attention focuses on the shift from reasoning capacity to mere perception: 
the massive and passive use of TV and other ‘visual’ media prevents children from 
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creating an abstractive attitude that includes the ability to form general concepts, to 
make comparisons, and to acknowledge different points of view.  
 
Homo sapiens ... owes all his knowledge and all his progress in 
understanding to his abstractive capacity . . . our capacity to deal with 
political, social, and economic reality in which we live, and even more our 
capacity to subject nature to human being is based exclusively upon 
thinking through concepts, which are invisible and inexistent entities to the 
naked eye. . . . Summing up: all the knowledge of homo sapiens develops 
in the realm of the mundus intelligibilis (made up of concepts, and mental 
conceptions) which is not, in any circumstances, the mundus sensibilis 
perceived by our senses. And the point is this: television inverts the 
progress from the perceptible to the intelligible and reverses it into the 
ictu oculi, i.e. into a return to mere sight. Television produces images and 
effaces concepts: but by doing so, it atrophies our abstracting capacity 
and, consequently, all our capacity for understanding [SARTORI 1997, 
pp. 22-3]. 
 
 We cannot inquire here into Sartori’s theory of knowledge, but we have to carefully 
interpret his text in a way that rejects unilateral, hasty and trivializing readings, without 
wasting its argumentative potential. We need not inflict banishment and ostracism on 
the perceptual dimension of human knowledge. As the studies of Gestaltpsycologie and 
the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty have showed, perception is an essential and primary 
moment of human cognitive process, with autonomous laws of construction of the 
percept. Perception is not the mere and passive registration of unrelated data, but the 
assembling of meaningful totalities, of forms (Gestalten) which have a sense not because 
of the high-order activity of thinking, nor through the application of intellectual 
categories, but by virtue of endogenous rules of constitution. We have not to slide into 
the intellectualist prejudice (accessory to the sensationalist oneix) according to which the 
first moment of knowledge is merely a received sensory stimulus on which the activity 
of the intellect imposes a form. Perceptual knowledge is already-in-form, and presents 
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itself in meaningful configurations, in discrete and segregated figures which our 
perceptual system structures [KANIZSA 1980; KANIZSA 1991; BOZZI 1989]. The 
primacy of perception [MERLEAU-PONTY 2004]--the fact that every piece of knowledge 
emerges from an original and fundamental relationship with the life-world, doesn’t 
exclude but implies a “primacy of the abstract” [HAYEK 1988, cap. III]: we don’t deal 
with – as the empiricist model maintains – an amorphous sensory material that the 
subject passively receives, rather: 
What we call knowledge is first a system of norms of action assisted and 
modified by rules which indicate equivalences or differences or various 
combinations of stimuli ... in the last analysis all sensory experiences, 
perceptions, images, concepts etc. ... derive their peculiar properties from 
the norms of action they apply and it doesn’t make sense to speak about 
thinking or perceiving unless as the function of an acting organism in 
which the differentiation of the stimuli shows itself in the differences in 
the dispositions to act that they cause» [HAYEK 1988, p. 51. My 
translation from the Italian version]x. 
 
In other words, the categorial attitude is rooted in the sensory order--it doesn’t 
intervene a second time. Homo percipiens is not therefore the antagonist of homo sapiens 
but he is homo sapiens in so far as he is originally related to the world through the lived 
body. By modifying Sartori’s argumentation slightly, we can say that the adversary of 
homo sapiens is homo tele-videns, exposed to a destructured and desultory flux of images, 
a haphazard and syncopated sequence that doesn’t permit and doesn’t require any mise 
en formexi because it doesn’t appeal to any cognitive activity but to sheer jouissance 
[MAFFESSOLI 1990]xii, that is, to a feeling of immersion in a captivating and rutilant 
(but also indistinct and undifferentiated) world of appearances. This homo tele-videns 
isn’t homo percipiens to the extent that perception is our primary contact with world 
through our lived body: homo tele-videns is far from the context of the Lebenswelt (in the 
original Husserlian meaning of the term), he is un-sensitive to it because he is titillated 
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at the level of a sensoriality which has cut off its ties with the lived body as primordial 
openness to the world, and is consigned to the excitability of the aesthetic (in 
Maffessoli’s sense of the word) ecstasyxiii. The child before TV screen or playstation isn’t 
a being exploring the world actively through its body but  is the target of a 
bombardment of charming images which immobilize it in a sort of apathy (or in frantic 
activity with a joystick), insulate it from  context, prevent it from every inquiry. 
Together with the perceptive dimension – in the strong meaning we are referring to - the 
categorial attitude is lost too: the world is no more an object of knowledge but of a sheer 
hedonistic appropriation, linked with a relentless solicitation of sensory surfaces. As 
regards this side of the problem—one that Sartori doesn’t approach but that can be 
integrated into his reflection--educational strategies must aim on the one hand at 
providing children with the intellectual means for a critical consumption of mass-media 
and on the other hand at educating visual thinking [ARNHEIM 1997] through the 
figurative arts, which permits the restoration of the abstract-categorial aspect of 
perception. Although these educational actions promote reflection, they act at the level 
of what we can call a ‘pedagogy of perception’, whereas there is another side of the 
problem, which is more attuned to the worries of Sartori’s analysis. Recently Ann Sharp 
has reminded us: « I [am] convinced that philosophical concepts underlie our daily 
experience and if we want to make sense of the world there is a necessity to inquire 
about the meaning of those concepts and how they are related to our daily actions»xiv. 
Homo tele-videns, losing or even not developing at all the capacity of investigating the 
web of concepts of our daily life (both at the personal and the social levels), runs the risk 
of becoming unable to make sense of his own reality, of living in a world that has 
become divorced from meaning and is reduced to an object of manipulation and 
domination.  An education of and to thinking is necessary then [SANTI 2005; SANTI 
2006; STRIANO 1999; STRIANO 2003] through which homo tele-videns acquires (again) 
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the faculty of inquiry, the abilities of reasoning and complex thinking, in order to avoid 
relapsing into meaninglessness and to bolster the democratic (that is communicative 
and inquiring, as Dewey taught us) way of life. Philosophical practice with children is 
not only opposed to ‘video-culture’ but it is also an educational ‘strategy’ which can face 
the challenge that the birth of homo tele-videns presents to rationality. That strategy will 
be presented in the next section.  
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§2: OUT OF THE PLATO’S CAVE, OR RE-EDUCATING HOMO TELE-VIDENS 
 
At the centre of a Philosophy for Children session there is, not a TV screen where a 
flux of images passes with a hypnotic power of enchantment, but a whiteboard, or better 
still a sheaf of chart paper. On it the facilitator will write. That is the first important point 
to be underscored in our context. An Italian linguist who developed the ideas of Sartori 
maintained that we have entered a third phase in the history of human knowledge 
[SIMONE 2000]. The first phase started with the invention of writing; the second one 
with the invention of the movable-type printing. Both put value on what Simone calls 
«alphabetic vision». Alphabetic vision fosters the emergence of sequential and analytical 
intelligence, which is capable of structured argumentations and is (at) the source of that 
abstractive attitude which we are currently losing (at least according to both Sartori and 
Simone). The crisis of homo sapiens corresponds to the crisis of the alphabetic vision, 
which characterizes the third phase: in this epoch writing and reading are shelved and 
replaced by other (mainly perceptive and emotional, fusion-promoting instead of 
abstractive) forms of experience and relation with the world, so that thinking and 
education for thinking tend to become marginalized and neglected. Simone 
distinguishes two models of culture:  
1. Propositional cultures, which put emphasis on the saying, the analysing, the 
identification of differences, the establishing of hierarchies [SIMONE 2000, p. 
135]. Throughout history western civilization has been “propositional,” with all 
its achievements both at the political level (ideas of democracy, personal 
freedom etc.) and at the epistemic level (in terms of primacy of reason, analysis, 
science, critical thinking)  [Ibidem]; 
2. Non-propositional cultures. Here what obtains is a an experiential (and 
epistemic) attitude which is generic («because it doesn’t analyse the content of 
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thinking into clear elements but limits itself to evoking it globally, leaving it 
unanalysed and indistinct»), vague from a referential point of view («as ... it 
designates ... only general and undifferentiated categories»), destructured 
(«[because] it refuses the structure, both the hierarchical one of the components 
and the syntactical and textual one, or it uses extremely simple structures; it 
doesn’t use any hierarchy among the information that it presents ...») [SIMONE 
2000, p. 130].    
Now, «the language of newer generations shows a strong bias … toward the Great 
Fusion. . . instead of clear words people prefer vague allusion, indirect and generic 
evocation of shared experiences; there is the idea that it is not important giving names to 
the things and translating experiences into words or discourse, because people think 
that what really counts is rather having experiences, remembering them, re-evoking them, 
than telling them analytically or translating them into discourse» [SIMONE 2000, pp. 
136-7]xv.  
Things are totally different in a P4C session where, on the contrary, writing and reading are 
crucialxvi. The participants begin by reading a text (and an analysis of the texts of the 
curriculum would be of great significance in this context). During the session, what 
carries weight for the community of inquiry is written on sheets of paper and remains 
the patrimony of the community, which has in this way the possibility to preserve the 
memory of its inquiry.  Such way of proceeding belongs to the era of alphabetic vision, 
‘prior’ to the ‘birth’ of homo tele-videns and the emergence of the Age of Show Business 
[POSTMAN 2002]; it is still under the banner of the exposition, which is typical of the era 
of writing and of the printed book: 
 
Exposition is a mode of thought, a method of learning, and a means of 
expression. Almost all of the characteristics we associate with mature 
discourse were amplified by typography, which has the strongest 
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possible bias toward exposition: a sophisticated ability to think 
conceptually, deductively and sequentially; a high valuation of reason 
and order; an abhorrence of contradiction; a large capacity for 
detachment and objectivity; and a tolerance for delayed response 
[POSTMAN 2002].  
 
These frames are characteristic of the print-oriented mind, and more generally of 
mind as far as it is shaped by writing, and it is not immersed in the world of all-
pervading visuality. They persist in the P4C session, and are empowered there. 
Now, how does the session proceed? What follows the reading of the text? What is 
written at first on the paperboard (which is a sort of epicentre of the community of 
inquiry sitting in circle)? In what does the second step of the session – the construction of 
the agenda - consist? Participants in a P4C session begin by asking questions, a move 
whose importance for re-educating homo tele-videns can be assessed by considering some 
peculiarities of the image per se. The image is what it is--it shows itself, it has a high level 
of iconicity [SIMONE 2000]). Whoever sees a sequence of images always has the 
impression of understanding at least something. The understanding of images qua 
images seems quite unproblematic. Furthermore, especially in the case of motion 
pictures, images place us under a sort of spell. Our critical attitude weakens, we are 
captivated, enthralled like the protagonist of The Purple Rose of Cairo by Woody Allen. 
As homines videntes we risk being overwhelmed by the immediacy of the images, 
narcotized by a sort of ‘un-reflection’, and in this position are the very descendants of 
the prisoners in Plato’s cave who watch shadows on the wall and take them as the 
reality. Conversely, what does it mean to ask a question?xvii A question represents the 
openness of the experience [GADAMER 1983]--experience as openness and openness as 
experience:  
• experience as openness: there is experience when we come to know that things 
are other than we believed, when we don’t take them for granted. In order to get 
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to this we have to pass through the phase of questioning, of asking  whether 
things are one way or another;  
• openness as experience: asking questions is to call something into question. The 
object of the question is open because (and to the extent that) we don’t have a 
ready-made answer--if the question is a real one of course. Asking questions 
about something is «to put something in the openness of its problematic nature» 
[Gadamer 1983, p. 420]. 
For all these reasons, asking questions is «more difficult than answering» 
[GADAMER 1983, p. 419], as we can often verify in a P4C session, and as Socrates 
already knew:   
 
When interlocutors in the Socratic dialogue, embarrassed by having to 
answer Socrates’ pressing questions, want to reverse the roles and claim 
the supposedly favourable part of asking questions, just then they 
completely fail [Ibidem]. 
 
To call something in question can be excruciating because it means to accept the 
possible failure of our convictions and to realize that what we took for granted could be 
otherwise. Pathos mathos, Greeks used to say: learning is suffering, experiencing the 
(possible) nothingness of our most deep-seated beliefs. We are really far from the 
relaxing and narcotic ‘experience’ of homo tele-videns! 
In a P4C session, after the construction of the agenda the members of the community 
of inquiry develop a discussion plan. «The openness of a question does not mean an 
indefinite unlimitedness» [GADAMER 1983, p. 420]. Every real question has a horizon. 
In a P4C session the horizon isn’t traced through an imperious and arbitrary act but it 
emerges from the questions of the agenda through a deliberation of the community of inquiry 
which reflects upon the questions it asked. It is therefore a hermeneutic-reflective act: the 
community of inquiry questions the questions of the agenda, so to say, and recognizes 
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their sense, the direction(s) where they move.  To develop a discussion plan is therefore 
to take care to guard the questioning as openness to experience, and to preserve it in its 
horizon. It is to prevent it from disappearing and fading into an indefinite 
unlimitedness. To preserve the openness of the question is to be interested in it. It is to be in 
the midst of it, to be involved in it. Homo tele-videns is never really involved, is never 
really interested in this strong meaning. He is attracted through the polychromatic and 
charming variety of advertising. Homo tele-videns is under a spell, spellbound, bound and 
compelled to watch the shadows on the cave wall – like the prisoner in Plato’s myth. 
Homo tele-videns isn’t really interested, he lets the images fade away (through the remote 
control); on the contrary in a P4C session participants are interested, in the midst of the 
openness of questioning, and they guard its horizon--they don’t let it disappear. 
What follows the development of a discussion plan is not a conversation but a 
philosophical discussion. The model of ‘discussion’ for homo tele-videns is the talk show. 
In the talk show there is no co-construction of knowledge, problems are stated without 
looking for shared solutions, participants lay emphasis on lived and emotional 
experience and not on judgement based on reasons, they use generic and de-
contextualized notions [LIVINGSTON & LUNT 1994], they don’t take context into 
account [BAUMAN 2005, cap. V], they are insensitive to it (whereas sensitivity to context 
is one of the main characteristics of critical thinking [LIPMAN 1991, p. 121 sgg.]).  
Participants in a talk show confine themselves to insisting on their point of view; they 
neither listen nor argue but chat regardless of what their interlocutors say. In reality 
there are no interlocutors--people engaged in an exchange of thoughts, of logoi--but 
only chatting monads, so to speak, which are not interested, are not in the midst of the 
openness of the question/discussion, but encapsulated in their own preconceptions and 
unwilling to confront their own ideas, values, feelings along with those of other people. 
The talk show is the realm of the Gerede, of the chat [HEIDEGGER 1993, § 35]: 
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The chat is the possibility of understanding everything with no 
preliminary appropriation of the thing to be understood. From the 
beginning the chat protects from the danger of failing in this 
appropriation. The chat, which is within everyone’s grasp, not only 
exempts us from the task of a true understanding but it spreads an 
indifferent understanding, for which there is nothing more that is 
undisclosed . . . . It is sufficient to keep on talking groundlessly in order to 
pervert the openness in a closure.  Indeed, what is said is definitely 
assumed as „saying something“, that is, discovering. The chat, neglecting 
to go back to the grounds of what is said, is by its nature a process of 
closing. This closing is increased by the fact that the chat, because of its 
presumption to understand from the beginning what is spoken about, 
prevents from every new questioning and every discussion, by belittling 
and retarding them in a characteristic way.xviii 
 
Clichés, idées reçues and triviality are dominant in a talk show because, as Bourdieu 
remarks, one of the most important problems posed by television is the relationship 
between thinking and speed [BOURDIEU 1996, pp. 30-1]. To challenge preconceptions, 
to show their groundlessness, to deconstruct them and to demonstrate their 
fallaciousness, to argue by giving reasons for one’s statements, requires time, and 
neither time nor the possibility of building complex arguments are allowed to 
participants in TV shows, who are in need of putting their messages forward rapidly in 
order to keep alive the fleeting attention of audience.  On the contrary, in a 
philosophical discussion, whose archetype is the Socratic dialogue, what guides the 
discussion is die Sache selbst, the topic, the subject matter of the inquiry. Every 
participant is interested in the subject matter, is in the midst of it. He/she doesn’t insist 
on his/her standpoint but takes into account the sense of the dialogue, moves forward in 
the direction of dialogue.  This is the logos of the dialogue, its inner consequentiality 
[GADAMER 1983]. For this reason the members of a community of inquiry listen to 
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what their speech partners say, take into consideration different outlooks, analyse the 
problems, and seek shared solutions, without drawing upon the repertoire of banality. 
Finally, to ask questions, to be interested--that is, in the midst of the openness of 
question/discussion--is to be in question. We ourselves are in question when we discuss. 
We self-correct our beliefs and values. Self-correction is what a true philosophical 
discussion culminates in.xix 
So far we have been insisting on the analogy between homo tele-videns and the 
prisoners in Plato’s cave. But it is noteworthy that members of the community of 
inquiry, though opposite to the prisoners in the cave and animated by the logos (of 
dialogue), are not like the prisoner who, in Plato’s myth, sees the light of the Sun and 
recognizes the vacuity of the shades in the cave. The prisoner of the Platonic myth does 
not free himself autonomously from the chains,  he «[is] compelled [anagkazoito] to stand 
up, to turn his neck, and to walk» [PLATONE 1997 515c], «[is] compelled [anagkazoi] to 
look at the light», he is dragged by force [bia] «on the steep slope» in order to be led 
toward the light of the sun [PLATONE 1997 515e]--a lot of words related to compulsion 
and necessity recur throughout these famous Platonic pages and accompany the new 
awareness of the prisoner, who does not really change his condition because he 
remains subjected to necessity and coercion (to anagke and bia). Therefore, if we analyse 
carefully Plato’s text from a semantic and metaphorical point of view, what the 
prisoner experiences is far from a process of emancipation through knowledge of truth, 
but rather the continuation of his serfdom by other means. 
There is a meaningful textual clue to how Plato’s myth of the cave, if it is read 
without interpretative embellishments, opens a gap between philosophizing and 
freedom, between inquiry and emancipation, between democracy and education.  
When real objects (and not their simulacra) are shown to the prisoner (still dazzled and 
blinded by the light of the sun), he is compelled through questions to answer what it is that 
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he is seeing (the Greek passage reads as follows: anagkazoi eroton apokrinesthai oti estin 
[PLATONE 1997 515d]). The five words of the Greek text signalize the terrible truth of 
the myth of the cave (and perhaps--following Popper’s famous attack on platonic 
thought--a distinctive feature of Plato’s philosophy). Questioning--the very nucleus of 
P4C, and inquiry--which should be moved by eros (whose name seems to echo in the 
Greek verb for questioning/inquiring: erotaoxx), are perverted and transformed into an 
instrument of coercing into answering [anagkazoi apokrinesthai], which is not, in spite of 
its root (“krino”, to judge, to discern), an act of judgment and discernment but rather 
submission to pressure, necessity, and compulsion. And all this happens because 
knowledge in the platonic myth is not a cooperative research, nor communication and 
sharing of experiences, nor--as Dewey taught--an inquiry tightly linked with a 
democratic way of life, but it is an act of subordination to the Truth and its ‘guardians’ 
(the philosophers kings).  It is the attainment of a definitive and ultimate dimension 
(the essence, the tí estín, evoked in the quoted passage by the expression ‘oti estin’) that 
renders un-thinkable every further inquiry. 
While Dewey’s philosophy/theory of education (which is at the source of P4C) 
weaves together the notions of inquiry (an inquiry which is always open and becoming 
because there will always be indeterminate situations to be approached, new problems, 
and there are no final answers or essences), democracy (as great community [DEWEY 
2002]), and education in thinking. The platonic myth of cave, on the contrary, 
inaugurates a tradition of thought and a way of thinking that has dominated western 
civilization over centuries and that, under the banner of the ultimate knowledge of 
essences, rejects every idea of cooperation in the activity of knowingxxi, denies every 
emancipative value of philosophizing, and perverts it into a means of domination:   
 Philosophical education [in Plato’s Republic] has a definite political 
function. It puts a mark on the rulers, and it establishes a barrier between the 
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rulers and the ruled … Platonic wisdom is acquired largely for the sake of 
establishing a permanent political class rule [POPPER 2003, p. 157].  
 
Education for critical thinking is, therefore, banished from platonic ideal polis:  
  What are Plato’s institutional demands regarding his highest form of 
education? They are remarkable. He demands that only those who are past 
their prime of life should be admitted. “When their bodily strength begins to 
fail, and when they are past the age of public and military duties, then, and 
only then, should they be permitted to enter at will the sacred field …” 
namely, the field of the highest dialectical studies. Plato’s reason for this 
amazing rule is clear enough. He is afraid of the power of thought. “All great 
things are dangerous” is the remark by which he introduces the confession 
that he is afraid of the effect which philosophic thought may have upon 
brains which are not yet on the verge of the old age» [POPPER 2003, p. 141] 
 
We are really far from the ethos of P4C with its idea that we have to educate children in 
philosophy since an early age, that this education takes place within a community of 
inquiry and it is not a lone activity, and that, by so doing, we can bring them up to be 
free, conscious and reflective citizens of a fully democratic society.xxii Re-educating homo 
tele-videns through P4C is, therefore, not only to counter the ‘anti-meditative situation’ 
of our times but to set Plato’s prisoner free or, better, to let him free himself by his own 
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i M. Striano, La filosofia come educazione del pensiero. Una conversazione pedagogica con Mathew Lipman, in 
«Scuola e città», 1, 2000. Throughout this paper the focus is on the connection between democracy and education (in 
the age of ‘video-culture’) and therefore a crucial role will be played by Dewey’s idea of democracy as «a mode of 
associated life, a conjoint communicated experience» in which  «recognition of mutual interests [is] a factor in social 
control» and what takes place is «change in social habit, its continuous readjustment through meeting the new 
situations produced by varied intercourse» [DEWEY  1916, cap. VII, § 2]. I won’t dwell upon an investigation of the 
differences in the theories of democracy of Dewey and the other authors (such as Popper and Sartori) I’ll take into 
account. 
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ii In an important book Maffessoli wrote about an éthique de l’estéthique of which the most meaningful 
characteristics are: challenge to the role of rationality in the process of knowledge of reality and the prevailing of 
jouissance as main way of ‘appropriation’ of the world; the emergence of a sort of tribal feeling that emphasizes the 
sharing of emotions (and not therefore the fact of being involved together in an inquiry) as playing an essential role 
in the establishing of the community; the dominance of a hedonistic approach to reality instead of thinking and the 
critical attitude. Summing up: «le frivole, l’émotion, l’apparence ... toutes choses que l’on peut résumer par le mot 
esthétique ... ont profondément modifié la politique, la vie de l’entreprise, la communication, la publicité, la 
consummation» [MAFFESSOLI 1990, p. 11]. 
iii First of all critical thinking relies on criteria, that is, rules of judgment. It is therefore diametrically opposed to the 
chaotic and shapeless succession of images of the video-culture, for which we can use all the adjectives by which 
Lipman describe uncritical thinking: «[Uncritical thinking] is flabby, amorphous, arbitrary, specious, haphazard, and 
unstructured. The fact that critical thinking relies upon criteria suggests that it is well-founded, structured, and 
reinforced thinking» [LIPMAN 1991 p. 117]. Secondly, critical thinking is self-correcting, and therefore it is deeply 
different from the hypnotic assertiveness of many images of video-culture. Thirdly, critical thinking is sensitive to 
context, whereas the flux of images captures within a separate and phantasmagorical context upon which audience 
has no control (apart from remote control!). Creative thinking is self-transcending and generative, it gives rise to 
what is new and original, creates by thinking what is yet to think. Critical and creative thinking are two sides of the 
same coin [LIPMAN 1991, p. 86] and therefore the novelty to which creative thinking gives rise is not the unusual, 
exciting and spiced ‘stuff’ with which video-culture has to provide its audience in order to keep its attention alive 
(which is based mostly upon mere sensoriality), but it is the creation of new frames of thought, the invention of new 
theories, speculative innovation, and the discovery of new fields to explore. Caring thinking, in the interpretation of 
Echeverría (to which I’ll refer because of his emphasis on democracy), has as an object that «los niños y 
adolescentes vayan construyendo un proyecto personal (¿qué tipo de persona quiero ser?) y un proyecto social (¿En 
qué tipo de mundo quiero vivir?) La construcción y asimilación de estos proyectos personale y social, dentro de un 
marco democrático, encaminados a la acción congruente entre el pensar, el decir y el hacer, serían el producto más 
importante del desarollo del pensamiento valoral en la comunidad de diálogo» [ECHEVERRÍA 2004 pp. 70-1, n. 
20]. Caring thinking is especially meaningful in the age of video-culture. First of all, as Postman proved, TV 
advertisements are often like of religious parables [POSTMAN 1997, pp. 36 sgg.], they are not simply the source of 
commercial information but propagandize an ideology, or better still, an axiology of consumption which occupies the 
place deserted by other gods and other values. Educating caring thinking seems to be one of the most effective ways 
to equip children and adolescents with the skills to reason on the question of values, without succumbing to the 
sirens of consumerism. Secondly, ‘talk show culture’, which has a powerful impact on the world view of many 
young people, has an «intrinsic tendency ... to present the life of human beings, its essence, as an aggregate of 
individually lived problems which demand an individual solution and the use of resources which are owned at an 
individual level» [BAUMAN  2005, p. 180. My translation in English from the Italian version of Bauman’s text]. On 
the contrary educating caring thinking within the framework of the community of inquiry acts for the 
acknowledgment of the political – and therefore public – dimension of problems and of their solution, and can 
counter-balance the depletion in meaning that politics and the practice of democracy are undergoing in recent 
decades.  
iv Putting emphasis on the opposition between the practices of P4C and those promoted by video-culture doesn’t 
imply that I agree completely with a thermostatic view of education [POSTMAN 1983], which cannot be discussed 
here in its theoretical foundations.   
 
v Carrying on his controversy against the epistemology of Logical Positivism, Popper recognized that Neurath was 
the most lucid and enterprising member of the Vienna Circle. On Popper and Neurath as representative of two 
opposite epistemological approaches, see cfr. ZOLO 1986.  
vi On how in the last phase of Popper’s thought, after the end of the brief century, TV replaced communism as the 
arch-enemy of the open society cfr. BOSETTI 2002. 
vii K. R. Popper, Cattiva maestra televisione, Marsilio Editori, Venezia 2006. 
viii The translation from the Italian version of Popper’s text is mine. Italics mine. 
ix The entire Introduction to MERLEAU-PONTY 1995 is devoted to showing how the empiricist perspective and the 
intellectualist one converge (since both consign to oblivion the Lebenswelt). 
x Hayek explicitly refers to the Gestaltpsycologie and mentions Merleau-Ponty’s The Primacy of Perception, but he 
seems to move rather toward a ‘mentalist’ interpretation of perception than toward an investigation of embodiment 
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(which is, in our opinion, a more promising direction of inquiry). But it is not possible to dwell here upon an analysis 
of Hayek’s epistemology. 
xi These characteristics are suitable mainly to what Umberto Eco called neotelevision, born «with the multiplication 
of channels, with denationalization, with the introduction of weird electronic devices» [ECO 1983, p. 163]. The 
world of neotelevision is, in Postman’s words, a peek-a-boo world, «where now this event, now that pops into view 
for a moment, then vanishes again. It is a world without much coherence or sense, a world that does not task us, 
indeed does not permit us to do anything. It is like child’s game of peek-a-boo entirely self-contained and endlessly 
entertaining» [POSTMAN 2002, PP. 98-9. My translation from the Italian version of Postman’s book]. 
xii Some of Postman’s ideas can be placed side by side with Maffessoli’s idea of jouissance: «What I deplore is not 
that television entertains, but the fact that it made amusement the natural model to represent experience. Television 
keeps us in constant contact with the world, but it does it with a face whose eternally smiling expression is 
inalterable. The problem isn’t that television entertains but that all topics are presented as amusement, which is a 
completely different thing » [POSTMAN 2002, PP. 107-8. My translation from the Italian version of Postman’s 
book]. 
xiii Within a different theoretical framework, much more focused on the role and the significance of information, 
Postman draws a similar conclusion, speaking of pseudo-context in reference to telegraph and photography (the 
forebears of television in his theory):«A pseudo-context is a structure invented to give fragmented and irrelevant 
information a seeming use. But it is a use that leads neither to act nor to solve a problem nor to change anything. It is 
the only use left to information that does not have any real connection with our life ... The pseudo-context is the last 
refuge, so to say, for a culture that is choked by irrelevance, incoherence and impotence » [Ibidem, p. 97. My 
translation from the Italian version of Postman’s book]. 
xiv STRIANO & OLIVERIO 2007 (a cura di), Philosophy for Children: una via educativa alla filosofia. Intervista 
biografico-teoretica ad Ann M. Sharp, in «IRIDE», XX, 51, agosto 2007, p. 258. 
xv It may be superfluous to point out the affinity between what Simone calls Great Fusion and Maffessoli’s éthique 
de l’estéthique (cfr. supra n. 2). 
xvi «[P4C] feeds bias toward philosophical inquiry and, therefore, it deals with critical thinking (autonomous and 
logical reasoning, de-contextualized language etc.). From this last point of view “Philosophy for Children” shows its 
inclination toward written language » [COSENTINO 1997].  
 
xvii I’ll draw here on some wonderful pages by H.G.Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, J.C.B. Mohr, Tübingen 1960 
Second Part, II, 3, c). I used the Italian translation by Gianni Vattimo (Milan 1983). The translation in English is 
mine (and from the Italian version of Gadamer’s work). 
xviii «Das Gerede ist die Möglichkeit, alles zu verstehen ohne vorgängige Zueignung der Sache. Das Gerede behütet 
schon vor der Gefahr, bei einer solchen Zueignung zu schietern. Das Gerede, das jeder aufraffen kann, entbindet 
nicht nur von der Aufgabe echten Verstehens, sondern bildet eine indifferente Verständlichkeit aus, der nichts mehr 
verschlossen ist … Das bodenlosen Gesagtsein und Weitergesagtwerden reicht hin, dass sich das Erschliessen 
verkehrt zu einem Verschliessen. Denn Gesagtes wird zunächst immer verstanden als “sagendes”, das ist entdeckend. 
Das Gerede ist sonach von Hause aus, gemäss der ihm eigenen Unterlassung des Rückgang auf den Boden des 
Beredeten, ein Verschliessen. Dieses wird erneut dadurch gesteigert, dass das Gerede, darin vermeintlich das 
Verständnis des Beredeten erreicht ist, auf Grund dieser Vermeintlichkeit jades neue Fragen und alle 
Auseinandersetzung hintanhält und in eigentümlicher Weise niederhält und retardiert» [Heidegger 1993, p. 169]. 
English translation is by me from the original German text. 
xix In a P4C session there is a last phase, evaluation, which is not taken into account in this paper.  
xx What I’m maintaining here is not that the Greek verb erotao stems from eros, but that in the verbal form we can 
recognize an echo of this word. In other words: the ‘etymological’ statement is rather based on a misreading à la 
Geoffrey Hartman (or other deconstrutionist critics) than on philology. 
xxi It is worth remembering that in the platonic myth prisoners are represented speaking with each other either about 
visions that are devoid of reality [515b] or in order to laugh at their fellow inmate who saw the real objects [517]. No 
mention of co-construction or sharing of knowledge is made in the text. 
xxii On the political implications of P4C (and therefore the connection between childhood and philosophy) cfr. 
KOHAN 2005. 
xxiii It is not possible to dwell upon a topic which is strictly related to what we are saying: emancipating Plato’s 
prisoners (in the plural because it is a cooperative-democratic process whose centre is the community of inquiry) or, 
 
childhood & philosophy, v. 3, n. 6, jul./dez. 2007   
 
childhood & philosophy, v. 3, n. 6, jul./dez. 2007                                                             issn 1554-6713 
26
                                                                                                                                                              
in other words, bridging the gap between philosophy and democracy, knowledge and education, requires a deep 
reflection on the meaning of childhood [KENNEDY 2006]. 
